

Who Benefits from the Decline of American Manufacturing?  
Evidence from 142,663 Foreign and Domestic Entries in China.

*Li, Makaew & Maksimovic*

Discussion – ASSA 2019

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# Motivation

## Mechanism of Trade Liberalization in Developing Economies (China)

- Which firm respond to liberalization, enter the economy or the export market
- Which firm has revenue going up

## Important question: to think about gains from trade

- Ownership of capital matters: heterogeneous effect on inside and outside capital
- Caricature of old IMF policy prescription:
  - ▶ Economy becomes more efficient
  - ▶ Only foreign firms with financing (and know-how) extract rents

# Plan

**1** Summary

**2** Comments

# This Paper

## Trade shocks on local firms?

- Use PNTR (Pierce & Schott) as an industry level trade shock
- Asks where do we see the impact, but flips the globe and looks at China
  - ▶ Which firms are set to expand into exporting

## Hypothesis

- Responsiveness to trade liberalization depends on financing capacity

## Results

- Foreign and large firms with less financing constraints benefit
- Regions with better financing development

# Existing Literature


## Trade and Finance

- *Peek & Rosengreen*: highlight the role of financing frictions to understand cross border trade flows
- Focus on bank lending


## Structure of Exporting Decision

- Exporting requires large initial investment at the extensive margin
- *Becker et al.*; *Manova*

## How is this different?



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## Main Specification

$$\Delta y_i = \beta \cdot \text{PNTR-gap}_J \times \kappa_i + u_i$$

- LHS: extensive margin, discrete variable: entry in sample or exporting decision
- Baseline coefficient: what is the effect of normalization of trade relations?
  - ▶ See Pierce & Schott
- Interaction: Is there heterogeneous treatment effect with respect to financing conditions.

## Summary of Main Results

- 1 Foreign financed firms enter (created?) China after PNTR
  - ▶ See Table 3
- 2 All firms (domestic and foreign) export more
  - ▶ Especially firms that are not financially constrained
  - ▶ See Table 4
- 3 Size of firms predict how responsive they are to PNTR

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### How does funding change conditioning on exporting?

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### What is foreign investment?

- Low average foreign investment for a given firm
- Is it just foreign capital or joint venture that comes with control?
- What is the status of capital flows regulation around 2001?

# Policy implications

**Liberalization benefits firms with financing capacity**

**Policy Implications?**

- Liberalization lead to a redistribution of rents towards foreign and large firms
- Role for capital controls in such environment?

**State of China's Policy in 2001?**

- What is behind foreign invested firm?
  - ▶ give example; who owns control rights?
- Gains for local workers? What happens to employment and wages locally?

## Other Comments

### Title

- If US manufacturing firms are the ones investing in China, can we say they are losing?

### Trade Shocks

- Other trade shocks: Autor et al.; Barrot et al.

### Results hard to reconcile with theory?

- Melitz model with financing constraints
- Following trade liberalization, it should be easier to to enter export market, not harder

### Continuous variables

- Revenue
- Employment

# Risk Sharing and Redistribution in International Trade

## Trade Shocks

- Affect both capital and labor
- Labor is immobile and effect is easy to account for
  - ▶ Careful to account for changing consumption basket
- Capital is mobile: unclear to whom changing rents are accruing to

## Barrot et al.; Loualiche

- Initial capital ownership matters for the gains from trade
  - ▶ Barrot et al.: if home bias in portfolio, import competition is priced as a negative shock looking at equity prices
- This paper shows there is a tradeoff:
  - ▶ outside capital allows to expand exports: good for labor
  - ▶ capital share goes mostly to foreign capital and not domestic
- International portfolio position affects significantly the gains from trade calculations in standard models of international trades

# Final Thoughts

## Results

- Great data and great analysis
- Thought provoking results about who benefits from trade liberalization

## Some shortcomings

- Role of state financing
- Real long term effects

## Take away

- Should we pair trade liberalization policies with financing subsidies to local firms?
- Looking forward to the next version!